No. 08-964 
 
In The 
Supreme Court of the United States 
 
-------------------------- ♦ --------------------------- 
 
BERNARD L. BILSKI and RAND A. WARSAW, 
 
Petitioners, 
 
v. 
 JOHN J. DOLL, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY of 
COMMERCE and INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
and ACTING DIRECTOR, PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE 
 
Respondent. 
 
-------------------------- ♦ -------------------------- 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO  
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
-------------------------- ♦ -------------------------- 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE  
CONEJO VALLEY BAR ASSOCIATION  
IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY  
-------------------------- ♦ -------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
Steven C. Sereboff 
Counsel of Record 
M. Kala Sarvaiya 
Mark A. Goldstein 
Michael D. Harris 
SOCAL IP LAW GROUP LLP 
310 North Westlake Boulevard, Suite 120 
Westlake Village, California  91362 
(805) 230-1350 
 Counsel for Amicus Curiae 
Conejo Valley Bar Association       Dated:  August 3, 2009 
 
THE LEX GROUPDC  1750 K Street N.W.  Suite 475  Washington, DC  20006 
(202) 955-0001  (800) 815-3791  Fax: (202) 955-0022 www.thelexgroup.com 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Page 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS..............................................i 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................iii 
 INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE...................1 
 INTRODUCTION AND  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 2 
 
ARGUMENT............................................................... 3 
 
I. 
The Statutory Language of § 101 
and the Legislative Intent 
Support a Broad Interpretation 
of the Term “Process.” ........................... 3 
 
II. 
The Patent Act Already Limits 
What Inventions May Be 
Patented................................................. 8 
 
A. 
Inventions Must Be Novel.......... 8 
 B.  Inventions Cannot Be 
Obvious Variations of the 
Prior Art.................................... 10 
 C.  The Invention Must Be 
Fully Disclosed.......................... 13 
 
D. 
Inventions Must Be Useful ...... 14 
 

 
ii
III.  The Patent Act Includes an 
Absolute Limit on Any Patent 
that Overcomes the Hurdles of 
Novelty, Nonobviousness and 
Disclosure ............................................ 15 
 
IV. 
Limiting the Kinds of Patentable 
Processes Can Only Be 
Overreaching Judicial 
Legislation........................................... 16 
 
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 18 
 
   
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
  
 

 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
Page(s)  
CASES 
 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.
 
489 U.S. 141 (1989).................................... 9, 19 
 
Brenner v. Manson,  
383 U.S. 519 (1966).................................. 14, 15 
 Corning v. Burden,  
56 U.S. 252 (1854)............................................ 6 
 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,  
447 U.S. 303 (1980).............................. 3, 5, 6, 7 
 
Eldred v. Ashcroft,  
537 U.S. 186 (2003)........................................ 18 
 
In re Bergstrom,  
57 C.C.P.A. 1240 (CCPA 1970)........................ 8 
 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.  
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc.,  
534 U.S. 124 (2001).......................................... 5 
 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,  
550 U.S. 398 (2007)............................ 11, 12, 13 
 
Mazer v. Stein,  
347 U.S. 201 (1954).......................................... 3 
 
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs, Inc.  
525 U.S. 55 (1998).......................................... 10 

 
iv
Stewart v Abend,  
495 U.S. 207 (1990)........................................ 17 
 
Tilghman v. Proctor,  
102 U.S. 707 (1881).......................................... 6 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
 
U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8................................ 3, 12 
 STATUTES 
 Copyright Act............................................................18 
 35 U.S.C. § 100(b)...................................................6, 7 
 35 U.S.C. § 101 ................................................. passim 
 35 U.S.C. § 102 ................................................. passim 
 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).......................................................9 
 
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ....................................................... 9 
 
35 U.S.C. § 103 ................................................. passim 
 
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ..................................................... 10 
 
35 U.S.C. § 112 ................................................. passim 
 35 U.S.C. § 154 .....................................................2, 15 
 
RULE 
 SUP. CT. R. 37.6 ..........................................................1 

 

Brief Of Amicus Curiae 
Conejo Valley Bar Association 
In Support Of Neither Party 
 
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 
 
Based in the heart of Southern California’s 
101 Technology Corridor, the Conejo Valley Bar 
Association draws its membership from local law 
firms and in-house attorneys serving small, mid-
market and large companies.  Our members’ clients 
are predominantly high tech, high growth companies 
in fields such as software, biotech, computer 
networking, telecommunications and 
semiconductors.  Our members’ clients are 
innovators who vend in some of the world’s most 
competitive markets. 
 When public policies of the patent system are 
at issue, the Conejo Valley Bar Association regularly 
participates as amicus curiae in cases before the 
Court and en banc panels of the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit.  We are unconcerned with the 
outcome of the cases, though decidedly concerned 
about the issues.  We wish to see the American 
public benefit from innovation, from technical 
                                                 
1  
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, Amicus states 
that no counsel for a party authorized this brief in whole or in 
part and that no person or entity other than Amicus, its 
members, and its counsel contributed monetarily to the 
preparation or submission of this brief.  With the consent of the 
parties, the Conejo Valley Bar Association submits this brief 
amicus curiae in support of neither party.  Copies of the letters 
of consent are filed with the Clerk of the Court herewith.  
Originals will be provided in due course. 
 
 
 

 

disclosure, and from competition in product and 
service markets.  In short, we support the purpose of 
the patent system.  The Conejo Valley Bar 
Association believes that the patent laws should be 
interpreted in ways that best serve these important 
public policies. 
INTRODUCTION AND  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
The underlying purpose of patent law is to 
encourage the development of inventions that 
provide value and benefit for society.  The Patent Act 
makes clear that if a process is new and useful, it is 
patentable.  Any test to determine which kinds of 
processes are patentable is unnecessary; all are 
patentable.  Through scrupulous application of other 
key provisions in the Patent Act, especially 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 
102 (novelty), 103 (obviousness) and 112 
(specification), the Patent and Trademark Office and 
the courts can protect the public from patents that 
seek to take too much from society.  These other 
provisions of the patent act, not Section 101, serve as 
a gatekeeper to restrict patents to those inventions 
that meet the requirements of other key provisions 
in the Patent Act.  If a patent application passes 
muster under all provisions of the Patent Act, the 
inventor receives a patent – but only for the “limited 
times” of the grant mandated by the Constitution 
and embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 154.  Limiting the kinds 
of patentable processes will reduce the incentive to 
patent and decrease the number of patentable 
inventions, causing vital and important inventions to 
be lost or otherwise secreted from society contrary to 
the purpose of patent law.  
 
 
 

 

ARGUMENT 
 
“The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and 
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of 
authors and inventors in ‘Science and the useful 
Arts.’”2 
 I.  The Statutory Language of § 101 
and the Legislative Intent Support 
a Broad Interpretation of the Term 
“Process.” 
 The Constitution grants Congress broad 
power to legislate to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”3    The 
Constitution expresses a public policy of promoting 
innovation.  In exchange for innovation, the inventor 
gets ownership of the commercialization of an idea 
for a limited period of time.   
 
  
   
                                                 
2  
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 
3  
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) 
(citing Art. I, § 8, cl. 8).  
 
 
 

 

 Abraham Lincoln stated in his “Second 
Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions”: 
 
Next came the Patent laws. 
These began in England in 1624; and, 
in this country, with the adoption of our 
constitution. Before then, any man 
might instantly use what another had 
invented; so that the inventor had no 
special advantage from his own 
invention. The patent system changed 
this;  secured to the inventor, for a 
limited time, the exclusive use of 
his invention; and thereby added 
the fuel of interest to the fire of 
genius, in the discovery and 
production of new and useful 
things(emphasis added) 
 
Congress created the Patent Act to embody 
these ideals. The law struck a careful balance 
between competing public and private interests in 
order to promote innovation.  In this regard, the 
statute promises: 
 
Whoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process
machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefore, subject to the 
 
 
 

 

conditions and requirements of this 
title.4 
 
The central inquiry in this case turns on how 
broadly to construe “process when determining what 
constitutes patentable subject matter.  The Court in 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc.
and in Diamond v. Chakrabarty6 recognized that 
§ 101 has broad scope.7  The Court in Chakrabarty 
stated:  
 
The subject-matter provisions of 
the patent law have been cast in broad 
terms to fulfill the constitutional and 
statutory goal of promoting “the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts” 
with all that means for the social and 
economic benefits envisioned by 
Jefferson. Broad general language is 
not necessarily ambiguous when 
congressional objectives require broad 
terms.8 
 
                                                 
4  
35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
 
5  
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc.
534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
 
6  
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303. 
 
7  
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. 130-131. 
 
8  
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 315. 
 
 
 
 

 

In the middle of the 19th Century, the Court 
stated: “[A process] is included under the general 
term ‘useful art’.  An art may require one or more 
processes or machines to produce a certain result or 
manufacture.”9  Later in the 19th Century the Court 
explained:  “A process is an act or mode of acting, . .a 
conception of the mind, seen only by its effects when 
being executed or performed.”10  Though these cases 
do not address the term “process” in § 101, they 
demonstrate the historically broad interpretation of 
§ 101.  
 In addition, the legislative intent calls for 
“process” to be interpreted broadly.  In Chakrabarty
the Court noted that by choosing expansive terms 
such as “manufacture,” “compositions of matter” and 
the comprehensive modifier “any” in § 101, Congress 
intended the patent laws would receive broad 
scope.11  Similarly, Congress’ intent in choosing an 
expansive word such as “process” ensured that § 101 
would be construed broadly for processes that could 
be patented.   
 Section 100(b) also supports a broad 
construction of “process.”  The section states that 
“process” “means process, art, or method, and 
includes a new use of a known process, machine, 
manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”12  
                                                 
9  
Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1854). 
 
10  
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1881). 
 
11  
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 308
 
12  
35 U.S.C. § 100(b). 
 
 
 

 

 If Congress intended a narrow interpretation 
of “process,” it could have defined the term with 
limiting language.  However, Congress nowhere 
expresses such intent.  Instead, §§ 100(b) and 101 
use expansive language to define “process.”  Thus, 
any narrow interpretation of the term “process,” 
even if only limited to a machine or transformation 
of matter, is contrary to the language of § 101.  
 Further, the Court in Chakrabarty explained 
that the legislative history also supported a broad 
construction of the § 101.13  In particular, the Court 
stated:  
The Patent Act of 1793, authored 
by Thomas Jefferson, defined statutory 
subject matter as “any new and useful 
art, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new or 
useful improvement [thereof].” The Act 
embodied Jefferson's philosophy that 
“ingenuity should receive a liberal 
encouragement.” Subsequent patent 
statutes in 1836, 1870, and 1874 
employed this same broad language. In 
1952, when the patent laws were 
recodified, Congress replaced the word 
“art” with “process,” but otherwise left 
Jefferson's language intact. The 
Committee Reports accompanying the 
1952 Act inform us that Congress 
                                                                
 
13  
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S308. 
 
 
 

 

intended statutory subject matter to 
include anything under the sun 
that is made by man.” 
Thus, an examination of the patent laws and 
the legislative intent all indicate that the term 
“process” was included to ensure that any process or 
method is patentable so long as it withstands the 
Patent Act’s other requirements.   
 II.  The Patent Act Already Limits 
What Inventions May Be Patented 
 Instead of the courts inventing their own 
restrictions on patentable subject matter through 
interpretation of § 
101, the public policy of 
promoting innovation is best served by allowing the 
rest of the Patent Act, §§ 102, 103 and 112, to 
provide the only limits on the types of patentable 
processes.  
 
A. 
Inventions Must Be Novel 
 
Section 102 describes the statutory novelty 
required for patentability:14 
 
A person shall be entitled to a 
patent unless -- 
(a)  the invention was known or used by 
others in this country, or patented or 
described in a printed publication in 
this or a foreign country, before the 
                                                 
14  
In re Bergstrom, 57 C.C.P.A. 1240, 1249 (CCPA 1970). 
 
 
 

 

invention thereof by the applicant for 
patent, or 
(b) the invention was patented or 
described in a printed publication in 
this or a foreign country or in public use 
or on sale in this country more than one 
year prior to the date of application for 
patent in the United States. . .15 
 
In  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 
Inc., 16 the Court stated:  
 
Sections 102(a) and (b) operate in 
tandem to exclude from consideration 
for patent protection knowledge that is 
already available to the public. They 
express a congressional determination 
that the creation of a monopoly in such 
information would not only serve no 
socially useful purpose, but would in 
fact injure the public by removing 
existing knowledge from public use.17 
  
   
 
                                                 
15  
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b). 
 
16  
Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
 
17  
Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 148. 
 
 
 
 

 
10
Further, in Pfaff v. Wells Elecs18 the Court 
stated:  
 
Consistent with these ends, § 102 
of the Patent Act serves as a limiting 
provision, both excluding ideas that are 
in the public domain from patent 
protection and confining the duration of 
the monopoly to the statutory term. 
 
That is, § 102 ensures that even processes 
that may constitute patentable subject matter under 
§ 101, nonetheless may not deserve patent protection 
because these processes are not “novel” under § 102.  
Thus, § 102 serves as one constraint on ensuring 
that not any process receives patent protection. 
 
B. Inventions Cannot Be 
Obvious Variations of the 
Prior Art 
 
Section 103’s “nonobviousness” requirement 
further limits patent protection to material that 
cannot be readily created from publicly available 
material.19  Specifically, § 103(a) forbids issuance of 
a patent when “the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made to 
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which 
                                                 
18  
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998). 
 
19  
Id. at 150. 
 
 
 

 
11
said subject matter pertains.”20  Thus, processes that 
may constitute patentable subject matter under 
§ 101 still may not receive patent protection because 
they do not withstand the nonobviousness 
requirements of § 103.  The Patent Act therefore 
provides the necessary limits on the broad term 
“process” used in § 101. 
 The Court’s recent decision in KSR further 
protects the public from the over breadth concerns 
that may arise from construing the term “process” 
broadly:  
 
The principles underlying these 
cases are instructive when the question 
is whether a patent claiming the 
combination of elements of prior art is 
obvious. When a work is available in 
one field of endeavor, design incentives 
and other market forces can prompt 
variations of it, either in the same field 
or a different one. If a person of 
ordinary skill can implement a 
predictable variation, § 103 likely bars 
its patentability. For the same reason, 
if a technique has been used to improve 
one device, and a person of ordinary 
skill in the art would recognize that it 
would improve similar devices in the 
same way, using the technique is 
                                                 
20  
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). 
 
 
 
 

 
12
obvious unless its actual application is 
beyond his or her skill.21 
 
The Court further recognized that as 
technologies continue to advance, a new threshold 
will be used to determine whether the innovation is 
ordinary or nonobvious.22  Specifically, the Court 
stated:  
 
We build and create by bringing 
to the tangible and palpable reality 
around us new works based on instinct, 
simple logic, ordinary inferences, 
extraordinary ideas, and sometimes 
even genius. These advances, once part 
of our shared knowledge, define a new 
threshold from which innovation starts 
once more. And as progress beginning 
from higher levels of achievement is 
expected in the normal course, the 
results of ordinary innovation are not 
the subject of exclusive rights under the 
patent laws. Were it otherwise patents 
might stifle, rather than promote, the 
progress of useful arts. See U.S. Const., 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. These premises led to 
the bar on patents claiming obvious 
subject matter established in Hotchkiss 
and codified in § 103. Application of 
the bar must not be confined 
                                                 
21  
KSR, 550 U.S. 417. 
 
22  
Id. at 427. 
 
 
 

 
13
within a test or formulation too 
constrained to serve its purpose.23  
 As the Court recognized in KSR, imposing 
constraints risks not achieving the constraint’s 
purpose.  Just as the “teaching, suggestion, 
motivation” (TSM) test for nonobviousness was too 
constraining, a narrow interpretation of “process” 
also will be too constraining when deciding what 
constitutes patentable subject matter.    
 
C. 
The Invention Must Be Fully 
Disclosed 
 
Section 112 limits patents to those which 
provide full disclosure of the invention: 
 
The specification shall contain a 
written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of 
making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable 
any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same, 
and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of 
carrying out his invention.24 
 
 
Thus, through § 112, Congress limited patent 
protection only to those patents having a clear 
                                                 
23  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
24  
35 U.S.C.  § 112, ¶ 1 . 
 
 
 

 
14
description of the invention.  The patent must 
provide enough description to enable others to make 
and use the invention.  Finally, the patent must also 
disclose the best mode of carrying out the invention.  
These requirements ensure that patentees do not 
receive overly broad scope in patent protection. 
Instead, they only receive protection for what they 
really invented. Consequently, the public receives a 
full and fair disclosure in exchange.  Therefore, any 
process may constitute patentable subject matter, 
but it will receive patent protection only if it meets 
all other requirements of the Patent Act, including 
§§ 102, 103 and 112.   
 
D. 
Inventions Must Be Useful 
 In  Brenner v. Manson25, the Court 
explained: 
 
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by 
the Constitution and the Congress for 
granting a patent monopoly is the 
benefit derived by the public from an 
invention with substantial utility. 
 
Unless and until a process is refined 
and developed to this point - where 
specific benefit exists in currently 
available form - there is insufficient 
justification for permitting an applicant 
to engross what may prove to be a 
broad field.26 
                                                 
25  
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
 
26  
Id. at 534-35. 
 
 
 

 
15
 
Section 101 explicitly limits patent protection 
to those processes that have utility by requiring, 
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process” should be entitled to patent protection.27  As 
such, § 101 does not allow all processes to receive 
patent protection -- only those processes that provide 
some  utility.  The Court in Brenner  recognized that 
allowing inventors to receive a patent on a process 
that did not have any utility would enable inventors 
to obtain a hunting license.28  That is, it would 
reward them merely for searching for some 
invention, regardless of whether the invention 
provided any benefit to the public.29   
 
III. The Patent Act Includes an 
Absolute Limit on Any Patent that 
Overcomes the Hurdles of Novelty, 
Nonobviousness and Disclosure 
 
Patents are not diamonds: unlike diamonds, 
patents do not last forever.  In time, patents expire.  
Through the simple mechanism of expiration, the 
framers in the Constitution and Congress in the 
Patent Act provided absolute limits on what is 
patented.  Under § 154, most patents expire twenty 
years after the inventor first applied for patent 
protection.  Thus, even if an invention passes the 
novelty, nonobviousness and usefulness tests, and 
                                                                
 
27  
35 U.S.C. § 101 
 
28  
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35. 
 
29  
Id
 
 
 

 
16
the patent specification satisfies the disclosure 
requirements, no matter how big or small the 
invention, the patent will expire. 
 
Experience shows that patent applications are 
not all treated equally, and, in practice, patent 
pendency varies.  The PTO’s published statistics 
demonstrate that examination of applications for 
patents in some areas of technology take longer than 
applications in other areas.  Congress and the PTO 
through resource allocation have in effect controlled 
the patent term of different types of inventions.  The 
time from filing of a patent application to its grant 
for business methods are the longest.  Pendency can 
grow for many different reasons.  The PTO’s own 
backlog leads to deferral of the start of examination 
on many patent applications.  PTO procedures 
requiring several patent examiners to review 
allowance of patents in some fields also delays the 
grant of patents and limits the scope of their claims.  
Although informal, these procedures suppress some 
types of patents and have been particularly effective 
against business method applications.  This is long-
standing practice, and one which Congress certainly 
knows and can control.  Clearly, there is no need for 
the Judiciary Branch to intervene. 
 
IV.  Limiting the Kinds of Patentable 
Processes Can Only Be 
Overreaching Judicial Legislation 
 Any tests by the judiciary to limit processes 
deemed patentable are directly contrary to the 
language and intent of the Patent Act. The Patent 
Act says what it means and means what it says 
 
 
 

 
17
when it states that a patent may be obtained for 
any new and useful process.”   
 The Patent Act does not recite that only 
chemical processes may be patented.  The Patent Act 
does not recite that only processes performed by a 
machine may be patented.    The Patent Act does not 
recite that only processes performed by a human 
may be patented.  The Patent Act does not recite 
that business methods and software may not be 
patented.  The Patent Act simply recites that “any 
new and useful process” may be patented.   
 
There is no basis in the Patent Act or its 
history that hints that the kinds of processes that 
are patentable subject matter should be less than 
“any.”  Reading limitations that Congress did not 
intend into the statute runs the risk of stifling 
innovation instead of encouraging innovation. 
 
Inventors and investors need encouragement to 
invest in research and innovation. They should know 
their successful research and innovation will be 
rewarded.  Narrowly interpreting “process” hinders 
inventors from passionately pursuing their ideas 
since there would be no reward for investing time, 
capital, resources and effort in pursuing their 
innovative ideas.   
 The Patent Act reflects a balance created by 
Congress between public and private interests, one 
which this Court has been loathe to alter.30    By 
                                                 
30  
See Stewart v Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (“it is not 
our role to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to 
achieve”). 
 
 
 

 
18
excluding business method inventions and other 
kinds of processes from patentability, companies will 
be forced to maintain more valuable knowledge in 
secrecy.  This will decrease the pool of prior art and 
will create little incentive for inventors to disclose 
their inventions.  The underlying Constitutional 
purpose of the patent system and Congress’ balances 
will be upset.  “Calibrating rational economic 
incentives, however, like fashioning new rules in 
light of new technology is a task primarily for 
Congress not the courts.”31 
 It is within the purview of Congress to change 
what constitutes patentable subject matter.32  This is 
not a judicial task. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, a broad interpretation of the term 
“process” is essential to maintain the public policy of 
promoting innovation.  If the process passes the tests 
Congress established in §§ 102, 103 and 112, it is 
patentable.  The Patent Act neither expresses nor 
mandates any further test.  “[T]he applicant whose 
invention satisfies the requirements of novelty, 
nonobviousness, and utility, and who is willing to 
reveal to the public the substance of his discovery 
                                                 
31  
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 (2003). 
 
32  
In addressing changes to the Copyright Act, the Court 
reached the same conclusion: “The [Copyright Term Extension 
Act] reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, 
judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature’s 
domain.”  Id. at 205. 
 
 
 
 

 
19
and ‘the best mode . . . of carrying out his invention,’ 
is granted ‘the right to exclude others from making, 
using, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States’ for a limited time.”33  Accordingly, the public 
policy of promoting innovation is best served by 
defining the term “process” broadly in § 101 and not 
limiting the term in any manner.  Let §§ 102, 103, 
and 112 remain the limitation on patentable subject 
matter.  
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
 
                                                 
33  
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150 (citation omitted). 
 
 
 

 
20
For the foregoing reasons, we, the Conejo 
Valley Bar Association, urge the Court to reject the 
Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test, 
and any test for patentability, except those 
expressed in the Patent Act. 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
Steven C. Sereboff 
M. Kala Sarvaiya 
Mark A. Goldstein 
Michael D. Harris 
SOCAL IP LAW GROUP LLP 
310 N Westlake Blvd., Ste. 120 
Westlake Village, California  91362 
(805) 230-1350 
ssereboff@socalip.com 
 
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE  
CONEJO VALLEY BAR ASSOCIATION 
  
August 3, 2009 
 
 
 

In The  
Supreme Court of the United States 
 
No. 08-964 
 
BERNARD L. BILSKI and RAND A. WARSAW, 
Petitioners, 
 
v. 
 
  JOHN J. DOLL, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY of COMMERCE and 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY and ACTING DIRECTOR, PATENT 
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
Respondent. 
 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
  
I, Teodora I. Mihaylova, of lawful age, being duly sworn, upon my oath state 
that I did, on the August 3, 2009, hand filed with the Clerk’s Office of the Supreme 
Court of the United States forty (40) copies of this Brief of Amicus Curiae, and 
further sent, via UPS Ground, three (3) copies of said Petition to: 
Elena 
Kagan      J. 
Michael 
Jakes 
Counsel 
of 
Record 
     Counsel 
of 
Record 
   
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE                   FINNEGAN HENDERSON FARABOW 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW                                   GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP  
 
Washington, D.C. 20530                                              901 New York Avenue, N.W. 
(202) 
514-2217 
     Washington, 
D.C. 
20001 
Counsel 
for 
Respondent 
    (202) 408-4045 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel for Petitioners 
 
 
 ______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Affiant, Teodora I. Mihaylova 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE LEX GROUPDC 
       1750 

Street, 
NW, 
Suite 
475 
       Washington, 
DC 
 
20006 
       (202) 
955-0001 

I am duly authorized under the laws of the District of Columbia to administer 
oaths.  
       __________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notary Public 
  
 
 My Commission Expires:  
 
__________________________________ 
  
Steven C. Sereboff 
Counsel of Record 
M. Kala Sarvaiya 
Mark A. Goldstein 
Michael D. Harris 
SOCAL IP LAW GROUP LLP 
310 North Westlake Boulevard, Suite 120 
Westlake Village, California 91362 
(805) 230-1350 
 
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Conejo Valley Bar Association 
 

In The  
Supreme Court of the United States 
 
No. 08-964 
 
BERNARD L. BILSKI and RAND A. WARSAW, 
Petitioners, 
 
v. 
 
  JOHN J. DOLL, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY of COMMERCE and 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY and ACTING DIRECTOR, PATENT 
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
Respondent. 
 
AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE 
  This 
Brief 
of 
Amicus Curiae has been prepared using: 
  Microsoft 
Word 
2000; 
  Century 
Schoolbook; 
 
 
12 Point Type Space. 
 
As required by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the Brief of Amicus 
Curiae  contains 3,588 words, excluding the parts of the Petition that are exempted 
by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(d). 
 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Affiant, Teodora I. Mihaylova 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The LEX GroupDC 
       1750 

Street, 
NW, 
Suite 
475 
       Washington, 
DC 
 
20006 
       (202) 
955-0001 
 

 
I am duly authorized under the laws of the District of Columbia to administer 
oaths.  
       __________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notary Public 
  
 
 My Commission Expires:  
 
__________________________________ 
  
To Be Filed For: 
 Steven C. Sereboff 
Counsel of Record 
M. Kala Sarvaiya 
Mark A. Goldstein 
Michael D. Harris 
SOCAL IP LAW GROUP LLP 
310 North Westlake Boulevard, Suite 120 
Westlake Village, California  91362 
(805) 230-1350 
 
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Conejo Valley Bar Association 
 
   
  
  
  

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