No. 08-964 
 
In the Supreme Court of the United States 
 
BERNARD L. BILSKI AND RAND A. WARSAW, 
 Petitioners, 
v. 
JOHN J. DOLL, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF 
COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACTING 
DIRECTOR, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
 Respondent. 
 
On Writ Of Certiorari to the  
United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit 
 
BRIEF OF FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE 
DES CONSEILS EN PROPRIÉTÉ 
INDUSTRIELLE AS AMICUS CURIAE IN 
SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY 
MAXIM H. WALDBAUM 
Counsel of Record 
HENRY L. MANN 
SCHIFF HARDIN LLP 
900 THIRD AVENUE 
NEW YORK, NY  10022 
(212) 753-5000 
 
 
LEGAL PRINTERS  LLC, Washington DC !   202-747-2400 !   legalprinters.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................  iii 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ................... 1 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF 
ARGUMENT ........................................... 3 
ARGUMENT ...................................................... 4 
I.  PATENTABLE SUBJECT 
MATTER UNDER § 101 
SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS 
BROADLY AS POSSIBLE, IN 
KEEPING WITH THE 
SECTION’S STATUTORY 
LANGUAGE, IN ORDER TO 
ACCOUNT FOR THE 
UNPREDICTABLE NATURE OF 
INNOVATION IN 
TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE. ............4 
II.  THE MACHINE-OR-
TRANSFORMATION TEST FOR 
PROCESS CLAIMS 
UNNECESSARILY RESTRICTS 
THE SCOPE OF PATENTABLE 
SUBJECT MATTER BECAUSE 
THE PATENT ACT’S 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER 
§§ 102, 103, AND 112 ALREADY 
SERVE AS SUFFICIENT 
FILTERS FOR CLAIMS THAT 
ARE TRULY BEYOND THE 
SCOPE OF PATENTABILITY. ................7 
 
-i- 
 
 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(continued) 
 Page 
 
III.  AS TECHNOLOGY AND 
SCIENCE EVOLVE, RIGID 
SUBJECT MATTER 
REQUIREMENTS SUCH AS 
THE BILSKI MACHINE-OR-
TRANSFORMATION TEST 
WILL RAISE MORE 
QUESTIONS REGARDING 
SUBJECT MATTER 
ELIGIBILITY THAN THEY 
ANSWER. ......................................................9 
A.  The PTO’s Application of the 
State Street “Useful, Concrete 
and Tangible Result” Test 
Highlights the Futility of 
Rigid Tests for § 101. ....................... 9 
B. The 
Machine-or-
Transformation Test 
Similarly Fails to Provide 
Adequate Guidance, while 
Threatening the Viability of 
Many Innovations. ......................... 11 
CONCLUSION ................................................ 14 
 
 
-ii-  
 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
 Page(s) 
CASES 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 44 U.S. 303 
(1980) .................................................... 3, 4, 6 
In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) ............................................................. 7 
Ex parte Cornea-Hasegan, 2009 WL 86725 
(B.P.A.I. Jan. 13, 2009) .............................. 12 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) .......... 5 
In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) ..................................................... 7, 8, 9 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) ....... 5 
Ex parte Harris, 2009 WL 86719, (B.P.A.I. 
Jan. 13, 2009) ............................................. 13 
Ex parte Koo, 2008 WL 5054161 (B.P.A.I. 
Nov. 26, 2008) ............................................ 13 
Ex parte Langemyr, 2008 WL 5206740 
(B.P.A.I. May 28, 2008) .............................. 12 
Ex parte Nawathe et al., 2009 WL 327520 
(B.P.A.I. Feb. 9, 2009) ................................ 12 
O’Reilly v. Morse, 15. How. (56 U.S.) 62 
(1853) ............................................................ 5 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) .............. 5 
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ............................................ 6 
-iii- 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
 Page(s) 
Ex parte Uceda-Sosa, 2008 WL 4950944, 
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 18, 2008) ............................. 13 
Ex parte Wasynczuk, 2008 WL 2262377 
(B.P.A.I. June 2, 2008) ............................... 13 
STATUTES 
35 U.S.C. § 101 ...................................... passim 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Memorandum to the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office from Brian 
Hickman, Comments on Interim 
Guidelines (May 19, 2006) ............... 9, 10, 11 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. CONST., art. I § 8 ...................................... 8 
-iv- 

 
 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, Fédération 
Internationale Des Conseils En Propriété 
Industrielle (“FICPI”) submits this brief as amicus 
curiae  in support of neither party.1 All parties were 
notified of FICPI’s intent to file this brief and their 
consents to this filing have been filed with this 
Court. 
Established in 1906, FICPI is a Switzerland-
based international and non-political association of 
approximately 4,800 intellectual property attorneys 
from over eighty countries, including the United 
States. FICPI’s members represent individual 
inventors as well as large, medium and small 
companies. One of the members’ major roles is to 
advise inventors in intellectual property matters and 
secure protection for industrial innovation. FICPI 
supports predictable, balanced global protection of 
patents, the global harmonization of substantive 
patent law, and the interests of inventors and the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“the PTO”) for 
recognizing a fair scope of patent protection 
consistent with the goals of the patent system and 
the expectations of the inventing public. 
FICPI is concerned that the Federal Circuit has 
disregarded Congress’s intent of allowing for a broad 
scope of patentable subject matter in crafting an 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for Amicus 
Curiae  certifies that this brief was not written in whole or in 
part by counsel for any party, and that no person or entity other 
than  Amicus Curiae or its counsel has made a monetary 
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. 

 

 
arbitrary and artificial test that fails to anticipate 
future technology while usurping the roles of novelty, 
nonobviousness, and other Patent Law requirements 
as proper arbiters of patentability. 
FICPI’s members serve the world’s community of 
inventors in seeking protection for their inventions. 
Because many of its members are foreign 
practitioners, FICPI has a unique perspective on the 
global impact of the diminishing viability of certain 
categories of process claims in the United States. In 
this vein, FICPI desires to ensure that its members’ 
clients are afforded fair protection for their 
inventions, and therefore respectfully submits this 
brief in support of neither party. 

 

 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF 
ARGUMENT 
 
 
The Federal Circuit’s en banc holding in In re 
Bilski, imposing a threshold requirement that a 
process claim must be tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus or transform a particular article into a 
different state or thing in order to qualify as eligible 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C § 101, should be 
reversed because it arbitrarily and unnecessarily 
constricts the scope of patentable subject matter. The 
scope of patentable subject matter was appropriately 
defined by the Supreme Court in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty as “anything under the sun that is 
made by man.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 44 U.S. 
303, 309 (1980). The § 101 analysis should focus on 
the section’s substantive utilitarian requirement, 
rather than retrospectively attempting to rigidly 
define the categories of patentable subject matter 
without the foresight of the particular form 
technological innovations may take in the future.  
   The Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation 
test also unnecessarily narrows the pool of patent-
eligible process technologies, particularly as to 
software and information technology, as the 
established analyses required under §§ 102, 103, and 
112 already provide sufficient filtering of claims that 
are truly beyond the scope of protection intended by 
the Patent Act. Lastly, due to the rapidly-evolving 
nature of advances in science and technology, the 
narrow  Bilski  test, like its predecessors, will prove 
more confusing than clarifying as its strict 
requirements will become increasingly difficult to 
apply to emerging technologies. In fact, post-Bilski 

 

 
decisions at the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences show that the PTO is already 
struggling to consistently apply § 101 to existing 
fields of technology under the new test. As such, 
attempts to narrowly and strictly define the 
parameters of § 101-eligible subject matter should be 
abandoned, and the focus of the PTO and the courts 
should return to the Act’s requirements of utility, 
novelty, non-obviousness, and enablement. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
UNDER § 101 SHOULD BE CONSTRUED 
AS BROADLY AS POSSIBLE, IN 
KEEPING WITH THE SECTION’S 
STATUTORY LANGUAGE, IN ORDER TO 
ACCOUNT FOR THE UNPREDICTABLE 
NATURE OF INNOVATION IN 
TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE.  
  Consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 101’s language, 
providing that “any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof” may be patented as 
long as it meets all other statutory requirements set 
forth in the Patent Act, the parameters of patentable 
subject matter under § 101 should be broad and 
flexible in order to encompass the widest variety of 
new and useful inventions. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty lays out the appropriate test for § 101 
eligibility, defining patentable subject matter as 
“anything under the sun that is made by man” 
provided § 101’s utilitarian requirement is also met. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added). 

 

 
 
By their nature, innovations in science and 
technology often take unpredictable forms. As such, 
the drafters of the 1952 Patent Act put limited 
restrictions on the ambit of patentable subject matter 
under § 
101, requiring only that the process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter at 
issue be “new and useful” to be patent-eligible. 35 
U.S.C. § 101. Section 101 implicitly excludes “laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from 
the realm of patent-eligible subject matter, as 
articulated by the Supreme Court. Diamond v. Diehr
450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). See also O’Reilly v. Morse
15 How. (56 U.S.) 62 (1853) (denying a claim for the 
use of electromagnetism under § 101 because 
electromagnetism is a natural phenomenon); 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (finding a 
claim for an algorithm invalid under § 101 because it 
was no more than a representation of a law of 
nature);  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) 
(denying patent protection to a claim for an 
algorithm under § 101 because the application 
claimed nothing more than a law of nature and 
therefore was not new, but noting that “an inventive 
application” of such a principle may be patented). As 
these cases show, natural phenomena and laws of 
nature can never be “new” because they inherently 
preexist any human discovery, while abstract ideas 
are not “useful” absent any inventive and practical 
application. The categorical exclusions of laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from 
the reach of § 101 eligibility are thus directly 
warranted by the language of that Act itself. 
  Aside from these established exceptions, the 
parameters of § 101 must be construed broadly in 
order to allow for flexibility and adaptation to ever-

 

 
evolving technological innovations, keeping the doors 
of patentability open to new innovations regardless 
of whether their form fits within any previously-
known conception of “process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. In State 
Street, the Federal Circuit correctly instructed courts 
faced with § 101 challenges to focus not on a claim’s 
formalistic embodiment, but rather on whether the 
claimed invention was in fact useful. State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.
149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The question 
of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject 
matter should not focus on which of the four 
categories of subject matter a claim is directed to . . . 
but rather on the essential characteristics of the 
subject matter, in particular, its practical utility”). 
The simplicity and clarity of Chakrabarty’s “anything 
under the sun” standard will allow PTO examiners to 
focus their energy on § 
101’s straightforward 
utilitarian requirement, rather than struggling to 
retrospectively define the parameters of the four 
categories of patentable subject matter in the face of 
evolving technological formats. Chakrabarty, 44 U.S. 
at 309. 

 

 
II. 
THE MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION 
TEST FOR PROCESS CLAIMS 
UNNECESSARILY RESTRICTS THE 
SCOPE OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT 
MATTER BECAUSE THE PATENT ACT’S 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER §§ 
102, 103, 
AND 112 ALREADY SERVE AS 
SUFFICIENT FILTERS FOR CLAIMS 
THAT ARE TRULY BEYOND THE SCOPE 
OF PATENTABILITY. 
  Setting rigid, formalistic requirements for the 
form of patentable processes risks foreclosing the 
possibility of patent protection for many new and 
useful processes without need, as the case-specific 
analyses prescribed under §§ 102, 103, and 112 
already provide sufficient filtering of claims that do 
not warrant patent protection. Two Federal Circuit 
decisions post-Bilski  are illustrative. See In re 
Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding 
petitioner’s claims for a method and system for 
mandatory arbitration which did not require the use 
of any mechanical device invalid under § 101 because 
it failed the Bilski  test, even though the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences had previously 
found the claims invalid under § 
103); In re 
Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(invalidating claims for methods and paradigms for 
marketing products under Biski’s § 101 test even 
though the PTO examiner had previously found the 
claims invalid under §§ 102, 103 and 112). In both 
cases, the Federal Circuit’s application of Bilski was 
superfluous, as the claims at issue had already been 
found invalid on their merits as anticipated, obvious, 
or inadequately disclosed. Id.  

 

 
  Further, the reanalysis of the Comiskey and 
Ferguson claims under Bilski did not add any 
practical value to the broader issue at hand, i.e., how 
to approach and evaluate unprecedented innovation 
while remaining true to the Patent Act’s purpose of 
promoting “the progress of . . . useful arts.” U.S. 
CONST., art. I § 
8 (emphasis added). Simply 
dismissing potentially innovative and useful 
processes at the threshold, because they are not tied 
to a particular machine or do not transform one 
article into another state or thing, without reaching 
the heart of the patent analysis under §§ 102, 103 
and 112 provides little practical guidance for 
inventors working in unprecedented fields of 
technology. Rather, the Bilski test arbitrarily cuts off 
the prospect of patentability to many emerging 
technological fields simply because they do not fit 
within the familiar format of inventions past. 
  In her concurrence in In re Ferguson, Judge 
Newman expressed her discontent with the 
majority’s narrow interpretation of § 101 under 
Bilski, finding it incompatible with the changing 
nature of advances in technology. In re Ferguson, 558 
F.3d at 1040-41 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., 
concurring) (concurring in the judgment based on the 
PTO’s conclusion that the claims at issue were 
obvious and therefore failed under § 103). Judge 
Newman warned that the court’s application of 
Bilski’s machine-or-transformation test could create 
an artificial barrier to patentability for many new 
information technologies. Id. at 1041. While many of 
these methods and processes do not take the familiar 
physical form of past inventions, “blurring the 
traditional line between machine and human,” many 
nonetheless enhance human capabilities and 

 

 
therefore warrant at least a fair consideration under 
the Patent Act’s substantive criteria set forth in 
§§ 
102, 103 and 112. Id. at 1041. Foreclosing 
patentability to these new technologies at the § 101 
threshold is “unworthy of [the court’s] responsibility 
to support innovation in the future.” Id. at 1041. The 
more targeted statutory requirements of novelty, 
non-obviousness, and enablement serve as sufficient 
gatekeepers for the patent system, allowing for a 
flexible, case-by-case analysis of unprecedented 
subject matter.  
III.  AS TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE 
EVOLVE, RIGID SUBJECT MATTER 
REQUIREMENTS SUCH AS THE BILSKI 
MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION TEST 
WILL RAISE MORE QUESTIONS 
REGARDING SUBJECT MATTER 
ELIGIBILITY THAN THEY ANSWER. 
  Setting retrospective, rigid parameters for the 
categories of patentable subject matter will confuse, 
rather than clarify, the § 101 analysis, and take the 
focus away from more instructive and informative 
inquiries into utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and 
enablement. 
A. 
The PTO’s Application of the State 
Street “Useful, Concrete and Tangible 
Result” Test Highlights the Futility of 
Rigid Tests for § 101. 
 
In November 2005, many years after the decision 
in  State Street, the PTO promulgated the Interim 
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications for 
Subject Matter Eligibility (Nov. 22, 2005) 

 

 
(“Guidelines”) to clarify and streamline the § 101 
analysis under State Street, which was apparently 
causing confusion among examiners. However, the 
Guidelines featured eight distinct ancillary tests and 
additional subtests for determining whether a claim 
constituted statutory subject matter. Guidelines at 
14-23.  State Street’s useful, tangible, and concrete 
result test alone required four distinct sub-tests to 
clarify, albeit unsuccessfully, what exactly useful, 
tangible, and concrete results are. Id. at 20-22. Thus, 
the Guidelines produced even more inconsistent and 
conflicting results. 
  Many of the ancillary tests adopted in the 
Guidelines originated as attempts to clarify the 
meaning of previous requirements. See Memorandum 
to the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
from Brian Hickman, Comments on Interim 
Guidelines, 4 (May 19, 2006) (“Hickman”) (criticizing 
the PTO’s interpretation of certain § 101 case law, 
which resulted in further confusion).2 This hopeless 
                                                 
2  In a commentary expressing his consternation with the 
Guidelines, Hickman clarified that many of the distinct 
ancillary requirements adopted by the PTO “were originally 
nothing more than attempts to clarify the meaning of other 
requirements.” Hickman at 4. Using the State Street test to 
illuminate this point, he noted that “the ‘substantially 
repeatable result’ requirement stems from a USPTO attempt to 
clarify of the ‘concrete result’ requirement. Id. The ‘concrete 
result’ requirement stems from a judicial pronouncement of a 
‘useful, tangible and concrete result’ consideration. The ‘useful, 
tangible and concrete result’ consideration was originally given 
as an example of how a claim could be shown to satisfy the 
‘practical application’ requirement. The ‘practical application’ 
requirement was initially intended to help distinguish 
patentable eligible subject matter from ‘abstract ideas, laws of 
nature and natural phenomenon.’ Finally, the ‘abstract ideas, 
laws of nature and natural phenomenon’ categories were 
10 
 

 
array of overlapping tests resulted in disparate and 
conflicting interpretations by examiners. Id.  at 1-2 
(listing several examples of conflicting PTO 
rejections, including (1) a rejection that erroneously 
suggested that if the applicant had simply stated 
that the claimed method was performed on a 
computer, it would be saved from the abstract idea 
exception because the addition of a computer, 
without more, would assure that the claim produced 
a concrete, useful, tangible result and therefore had 
practical utility, and (2) a rejection for improper 
subject matter because the claims were not directed 
at a “final result that is useful, tangible, and 
concrete,” convoluting the State Street test).  
B. 
The Machine-or-Transformation Test 
Similarly Fails to Provide Adequate 
Guidance while Threatening the 
Viability of Many Innovations. 
 In establishing the new machine-or-
transformation test, which was designed to cut 
through some of the confusion surrounding the 
useful, tangible, and concrete test, the Bilski 
majority reaffirmed the concept that process claims 
(including software and business methods) are 
“‘subject to the same legal requirements for 
patentability as applied to any other process or 
method.’”  Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960 (quoting State 
Street, 149 F.3d at 1375-76). Although the majority 
acknowledged that “future developments in 
technology and the sciences may present difficult 
challenges to the machine-or-transformation test” 
                                                                                                     
created to explain what types of things do not fall into any of 
the four statutory categories of section 101.” Hickman at 4. 
 
11 
 

 
that require altering it or even setting it aside, the 
reality is that the test has already proven difficult to 
consistently apply, and has had a detrimental impact 
on the patentability of many existing technological 
innovations. 
 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s assurance that it 
was declining to categorically bar certain categories 
of claims, the practical result is nonetheless a great 
hindrance to the scope of patentability in many 
software-related fields. In particular, the Federal 
Circuit failed to decide in Bilski whether a claim 
limitation of implementation on a “general purpose 
computer” (e.g., a personal computer) would tie a 
claim to a “particular machine” for purposes of the 
machine-or-transformation test. See 545 F.3d at 994 
(Newman, J., dissenting). Left with the decision, the 
PTO has answered the question in the negative, thus 
imperiling the viability of thousands of software and 
other computer-implemented claims, 
notwithstanding their usefulness, novelty, 
nonobviousness, and indeed, their social and 
economic value. See,  e.g.,  Ex parte Langemyr, 2008 
WL 5206740 (B.P.A.I. May 28, 2008) (rejecting as 
non-statutory subject matter a claim for a “method 
executed in a computer apparatus” for producing a 
model of a physical system using a set of equations 
because the transformation only occurs with respect 
to abstract equations and not to a physical article); 
Ex parte Nawathe et al., 2009 WL 327520 (B.P.A.I. 
Feb. 9, 2009) (distinguishing between a 
“computerized method” to a general purpose 
processor, which is not patentable, and a apparatus 
directed to a general purpose computer, which is 
patentable);  cf.  Ex parte Cornea-Hasegan, 2009 WL 
86725 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 13, 2009) (holding that a method 
12 
 

 
reciting a “processor” using “floating-point hardware” 
was not tied to a particular machine”); Ex parte 
Wasynczuk, 2008 WL 2262377 (B.P.A.I. June 2, 2008) 
(affirming the § 101 rejection of a claim that recited a 
“computer-implemented” process of modeling 
physical systems, but finding patentable a dependent 
claim that required the two steps of the claimed 
process to be performed by a first and second 
“physical computing device,” reasoning that an 
embodiment featuring two computers operating 
together was sufficient to constitute a “particular 
machine,” but not the embodiment specifying a single 
computer). 
 
 
Patents in other existing technological fields 
have also been imperiled by B.P.A.I. decisions that 
purportedly follow Bilski. In the computer 
networking field, the B.P.A.I. has determined that 
claims reciting “a number of clients,” “a network,” 
and “a server” are not tied to a particular machine. 
Ex parte Harris, 2009 WL 86719, (B.P.A.I. Jan. 13, 
2009);  cf.  Ex parte Uceda-Sosa, 2008 WL 4950944, 
(B.P.A.I. Nov. 18, 2008) (finding as eligible under 
§ 101 a claim directed to “a network executing a 
method”). With respect to databases, the B.P.A.I. in 
Ex parte Koo, 2008 WL 5054161 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 26, 
2008), found that a claim reciting “[a] method for 
optimizing a query in a relational database 
management system” not to be tied to a particular 
machine, reasoning that because a relational 
database system may be a software system, it is 
unpatentable if it fails to recite the system “in terms 
of hardware or tangible structural elements.” 
  As the foregoing illustrates, in addition to 
jeopardizing the patentability of otherwise useful 
13 
 

 
and innovative inventions, the Bilski machine-or-
transformation test, like State Street’s useful, 
concrete, and tangible result test before it, fails to 
provide adequate guidance for practitioners and 
examiners, thus leading to diverging interpretations. 
This failure is due in significant part to the 
limitations of language; it is inevitably challenging to 
fashion a easily-applied test that encompasses all of 
mankind’s inventive endeavors using words alone. 
  Rather than create more confusion and 
unnecessary debate over the parameters of § 101 by 
creating another test, the Court should focus the 
patent community’s attention back to the time-tested 
evaluations under §§ 102, 103, and 112. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
court of appeals should be reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAXIM H. WALDBAUM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Counsel of Record 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HENRY L. MANN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCHIFF HARDIN LLP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
900 THIRD AVENUE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEW YORK, NY 10022 
      (212) 753-5000 
14 
 

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