No. 08-964
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
-------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------
BERNARD L. BILSKI and RAND A. WARSAW,
Petitioners,
v.
JOHN J. DOLL, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY of
COMMERCE and INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
and ACTING DIRECTOR, PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE
Respondent.
-------------------------- ♦ --------------------------
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
-------------------------- ♦ --------------------------
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
CONEJO VALLEY BAR ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY
-------------------------- ♦ --------------------------
Steven C. Sereboff
Counsel of Record
M. Kala Sarvaiya
Mark A. Goldstein
Michael D. Harris
SOCAL IP LAW GROUP LLP
310 North Westlake Boulevard, Suite 120
Westlake Village, California 91362
(805) 230-1350
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Conejo Valley Bar Association Dated: August 3, 2009
THE LEX GROUPDC ♦ 1750 K Street N.W. ♦ Suite 475 ♦ Washington, DC 20006
(202) 955-0001 ♦ (800) 815-3791 ♦ Fax: (202) 955-0022 ♦www.thelexgroup.com
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS..............................................i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................iii
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE...................1
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 2
ARGUMENT............................................................... 3
I.
The Statutory Language of § 101
and the Legislative Intent
Support a Broad Interpretation
of the Term “Process.” ........................... 3
II.
The Patent Act Already Limits
What Inventions May Be
Patented................................................. 8
A.
Inventions Must Be Novel.......... 8
B. Inventions Cannot Be
Obvious Variations of the
Prior Art.................................... 10
C. The Invention Must Be
Fully Disclosed.......................... 13
D.
Inventions Must Be Useful ...... 14
ii
III. The Patent Act Includes an
Absolute Limit on Any Patent
that Overcomes the Hurdles of
Novelty, Nonobviousness and
Disclosure ............................................ 15
IV.
Limiting the Kinds of Patentable
Processes Can Only Be
Overreaching Judicial
Legislation........................................... 16
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 18
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141 (1989).................................... 9, 19
Brenner v. Manson,
383 U.S. 519 (1966).................................. 14, 15
Corning v. Burden,
56 U.S. 252 (1854)............................................ 6
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303 (1980).............................. 3, 5, 6, 7
Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003)........................................ 18
In re Bergstrom,
57 C.C.P.A. 1240 (CCPA 1970)........................ 8
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc.,
534 U.S. 124 (2001).......................................... 5
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398 (2007)............................ 11, 12, 13
Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201 (1954).......................................... 3
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs, Inc.
525 U.S. 55 (1998).......................................... 10
iv
Stewart v Abend,
495 U.S. 207 (1990)........................................ 17
Tilghman v. Proctor,
102 U.S. 707 (1881).......................................... 6
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8................................ 3, 12
STATUTES
Copyright Act............................................................18
35 U.S.C. § 100(b)...................................................6, 7
35 U.S.C. § 101 ................................................. passim
35 U.S.C. § 102 ................................................. passim
35 U.S.C. § 102(a).......................................................9
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ....................................................... 9
35 U.S.C. § 103 ................................................. passim
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ..................................................... 10
35 U.S.C. § 112 ................................................. passim
35 U.S.C. § 154 .....................................................2, 15
RULE
SUP. CT. R. 37.6 ..........................................................1
1
Brief Of Amicus Curiae
Conejo Valley Bar Association
In Support Of Neither Party 1
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
Based in the heart of Southern California’s
101 Technology Corridor, the Conejo Valley Bar
Association draws its membership from local law
firms and in-house attorneys serving small, mid-
market and large companies. Our members’ clients
are predominantly high tech, high growth companies
in fields such as software, biotech, computer
networking, telecommunications and
semiconductors. Our members’ clients are
innovators who vend in some of the world’s most
competitive markets.
When public policies of the patent system are
at issue, the Conejo Valley Bar Association regularly
participates as amicus curiae in cases before the
Court and en banc panels of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. We are unconcerned with the
outcome of the cases, though decidedly concerned
about the issues. We wish to see the American
public benefit from innovation, from technical
1
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, Amicus states
that no counsel for a party authorized this brief in whole or in
part and that no person or entity other than Amicus, its
members, and its counsel contributed monetarily to the
preparation or submission of this brief. With the consent of the
parties, the Conejo Valley Bar Association submits this brief
amicus curiae in support of neither party. Copies of the letters
of consent are filed with the Clerk of the Court herewith.
Originals will be provided in due course.
2
disclosure, and from competition in product and
service markets. In short, we support the purpose of
the patent system. The Conejo Valley Bar
Association believes that the patent laws should be
interpreted in ways that best serve these important
public policies.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The underlying purpose of patent law is to
encourage the development of inventions that
provide value and benefit for society. The Patent Act
makes clear that if a process is new and useful, it is
patentable. Any test to determine which kinds of
processes are patentable is unnecessary; all are
patentable. Through scrupulous application of other
key provisions in the Patent Act, especially 35 U.S.C.
§§
102 (novelty), 103 (obviousness) and 112
(specification), the Patent and Trademark Office and
the courts can protect the public from patents that
seek to take too much from society. These other
provisions of the patent act, not Section 101, serve as
a gatekeeper to restrict patents to those inventions
that meet the requirements of other key provisions
in the Patent Act. If a patent application passes
muster under all provisions of the Patent Act, the
inventor receives a patent – but only for the “limited
times” of the grant mandated by the Constitution
and embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 154. Limiting the kinds
of patentable processes will reduce the incentive to
patent and decrease the number of patentable
inventions, causing vital and important inventions to
be lost or otherwise secreted from society contrary to
the purpose of patent law.
3
ARGUMENT
“The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in ‘Science and the useful
Arts.’”2
I. The Statutory Language of § 101
and the Legislative Intent Support
a Broad Interpretation of the Term
“Process.”
The Constitution grants Congress broad
power to legislate to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”3 The
Constitution expresses a public policy of promoting
innovation. In exchange for innovation, the inventor
gets ownership of the commercialization of an idea
for a limited period of time.
2
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
3
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980)
(citing Art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
4
Abraham Lincoln stated in his “Second
Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions”:
Next came the Patent laws.
These began in England in 1624; and,
in this country, with the adoption of our
constitution. Before then, any man
might instantly use what another had
invented; so that the inventor had no
special advantage from his own
invention. The patent system changed
this; secured to the inventor, for a
limited time, the exclusive use of
his invention; and thereby added
the fuel of interest to the fire of
genius, in the discovery and
production of new and useful
things. (emphasis added)
Congress created the Patent Act to embody
these ideals. The law struck a careful balance
between competing public and private interests in
order to promote innovation. In this regard, the
statute promises:
Whoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefore, subject to the
5
conditions and requirements of this
title.4
The central inquiry in this case turns on how
broadly to construe “process” when determining what
constitutes patentable subject matter. The Court in
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc.5
and in Diamond v. Chakrabarty6 recognized that
§ 101 has broad scope.7 The Court in Chakrabarty
stated:
The subject-matter provisions of
the patent law have been cast in broad
terms to fulfill the constitutional and
statutory goal of promoting “the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts”
with all that means for the social and
economic benefits envisioned by
Jefferson. Broad general language is
not necessarily ambiguous when
congressional objectives require broad
terms.8
4
35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
5
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc.,
534 U.S. 124 (2001).
6
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303.
7
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. 130-131.
8
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 315.
6
In the middle of the 19th Century, the Court
stated: “[A process] is included under the general
term ‘useful art’. An art may require one or more
processes or machines to produce a certain result or
manufacture.”9 Later in the 19th Century the Court
explained: “A process is an act or mode of acting, . .a
conception of the mind, seen only by its effects when
being executed or performed.”10 Though these cases
do not address the term “process” in § 101, they
demonstrate the historically broad interpretation of
§ 101.
In addition, the legislative intent calls for
“process” to be interpreted broadly. In Chakrabarty,
the Court noted that by choosing expansive terms
such as “manufacture,” “compositions of matter” and
the comprehensive modifier “any” in § 101, Congress
intended the patent laws would receive broad
scope.11 Similarly, Congress’ intent in choosing an
expansive word such as “process” ensured that § 101
would be construed broadly for processes that could
be patented.
Section 100(b) also supports a broad
construction of “process.” The section states that
“process” “means process, art, or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”12
9
Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1854).
10
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1881).
11
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 308.
12
35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
7
If Congress intended a narrow interpretation
of “process,” it could have defined the term with
limiting language. However, Congress nowhere
expresses such intent. Instead, §§ 100(b) and 101
use expansive language to define “process.” Thus,
any narrow interpretation of the term “process,”
even if only limited to a machine or transformation
of matter, is contrary to the language of § 101.
Further, the Court in Chakrabarty explained
that the legislative history also supported a broad
construction of the § 101.13 In particular, the Court
stated:
The Patent Act of 1793, authored
by Thomas Jefferson, defined statutory
subject matter as “any new and useful
art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new or
useful improvement [thereof].” The Act
embodied Jefferson's philosophy that
“ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement.” Subsequent patent
statutes in 1836, 1870, and 1874
employed this same broad language. In
1952, when the patent laws were
recodified, Congress replaced the word
“art” with “process,” but otherwise left
Jefferson's language intact. The
Committee Reports accompanying the
1952 Act inform us that Congress
13
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 308.
8
intended statutory subject matter to
“include anything under the sun
that is made by man.”
Thus, an examination of the patent laws and
the legislative intent all indicate that the term
“process” was included to ensure that any process or
method is patentable so long as it withstands the
Patent Act’s other requirements.
II. The Patent Act Already Limits
What Inventions May Be Patented
Instead of the courts inventing their own
restrictions on patentable subject matter through
interpretation of §
101, the public policy of
promoting innovation is best served by allowing the
rest of the Patent Act, §§ 102, 103 and 112, to
provide the only limits on the types of patentable
processes.
A.
Inventions Must Be Novel
Section 102 describes the statutory novelty
required for patentability:14
A person shall be entitled to a
patent unless --
(a) the invention was known or used by
others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country, before the
14
In re Bergstrom, 57 C.C.P.A. 1240, 1249 (CCPA 1970).
9
invention thereof by the applicant for
patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or
described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country or in public use
or on sale in this country more than one
year prior to the date of application for
patent in the United States. . .15
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 16 the Court stated:
Sections 102(a) and (b) operate in
tandem to exclude from consideration
for patent protection knowledge that is
already available to the public. They
express a congressional determination
that the creation of a monopoly in such
information would not only serve no
socially useful purpose, but would in
fact injure the public by removing
existing knowledge from public use.17
15
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b).
16
Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
17
Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 148.
10
Further, in Pfaff v. Wells Elecs18 the Court
stated:
Consistent with these ends, § 102
of the Patent Act serves as a limiting
provision, both excluding ideas that are
in the public domain from patent
protection and confining the duration of
the monopoly to the statutory term.
That is, § 102 ensures that even processes
that may constitute patentable subject matter under
§ 101, nonetheless may not deserve patent protection
because these processes are not “novel” under § 102.
Thus, § 102 serves as one constraint on ensuring
that not any process receives patent protection.
B. Inventions Cannot Be
Obvious Variations of the
Prior Art
Section 103’s “nonobviousness” requirement
further limits patent protection to material that
cannot be readily created from publicly available
material.19 Specifically, § 103(a) forbids issuance of
a patent when “the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
18
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998).
19
Id. at 150.
11
said subject matter pertains.”20 Thus, processes that
may constitute patentable subject matter under
§ 101 still may not receive patent protection because
they do not withstand the nonobviousness
requirements of § 103. The Patent Act therefore
provides the necessary limits on the broad term
“process” used in § 101.
The Court’s recent decision in KSR further
protects the public from the over breadth concerns
that may arise from construing the term “process”
broadly:
The principles underlying these
cases are instructive when the question
is whether a patent claiming the
combination of elements of prior art is
obvious. When a work is available in
one field of endeavor, design incentives
and other market forces can prompt
variations of it, either in the same field
or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a
predictable variation, § 103 likely bars
its patentability. For the same reason,
if a technique has been used to improve
one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it
would improve similar devices in the
same way, using the technique is
20
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
12
obvious unless its actual application is
beyond his or her skill.21
The Court further recognized that as
technologies continue to advance, a new threshold
will be used to determine whether the innovation is
ordinary or nonobvious.22 Specifically, the Court
stated:
We build and create by bringing
to the tangible and palpable reality
around us new works based on instinct,
simple logic, ordinary inferences,
extraordinary ideas, and sometimes
even genius. These advances, once part
of our shared knowledge, define a new
threshold from which innovation starts
once more. And as progress beginning
from higher levels of achievement is
expected in the normal course, the
results of ordinary innovation are not
the subject of exclusive rights under the
patent laws. Were it otherwise patents
might stifle, rather than promote, the
progress of useful arts. See U.S. Const.,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. These premises led to
the bar on patents claiming obvious
subject matter established in Hotchkiss
and codified in § 103. Application of
the bar must not be confined
21
KSR, 550 U.S. 417.
22
Id. at 427.
13
within a test or formulation too
constrained to serve its purpose.23
As the Court recognized in KSR, imposing
constraints risks not achieving the constraint’s
purpose. Just as the “teaching, suggestion,
motivation” (TSM) test for nonobviousness was too
constraining, a narrow interpretation of “process”
also will be too constraining when deciding what
constitutes patentable subject matter.
C.
The Invention Must Be Fully
Disclosed
Section 112 limits patents to those which
provide full disclosure of the invention:
The specification shall contain a
written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention.24
Thus, through § 112, Congress limited patent
protection only to those patents having a clear
23
Id. (emphasis added).
24
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 .
14
description of the invention. The patent must
provide enough description to enable others to make
and use the invention. Finally, the patent must also
disclose the best mode of carrying out the invention.
These requirements ensure that patentees do not
receive overly broad scope in patent protection.
Instead, they only receive protection for what they
really invented. Consequently, the public receives a
full and fair disclosure in exchange. Therefore, any
process may constitute patentable subject matter,
but it will receive patent protection only if it meets
all other requirements of the Patent Act, including
§§ 102, 103 and 112.
D.
Inventions Must Be Useful
In Brenner v. Manson25, the Court
explained:
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by
the Constitution and the Congress for
granting a patent monopoly is the
benefit derived by the public from an
invention with substantial utility.
Unless and until a process is refined
and developed to this point - where
specific benefit exists in currently
available form - there is insufficient
justification for permitting an applicant
to engross what may prove to be a
broad field.26
25
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
26
Id. at 534-35.
15
Section 101 explicitly limits patent protection
to those processes that have utility by requiring,
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process” should be entitled to patent protection.27 As
such, § 101 does not allow all processes to receive
patent protection -- only those processes that provide
some utility. The Court in Brenner recognized that
allowing inventors to receive a patent on a process
that did not have any utility would enable inventors
to obtain a hunting license.28 That is, it would
reward them merely for searching for some
invention, regardless of whether the invention
provided any benefit to the public.29
III. The Patent Act Includes an
Absolute Limit on Any Patent that
Overcomes the Hurdles of Novelty,
Nonobviousness and Disclosure
Patents are not diamonds: unlike diamonds,
patents do not last forever. In time, patents expire.
Through the simple mechanism of expiration, the
framers in the Constitution and Congress in the
Patent Act provided absolute limits on what is
patented. Under § 154, most patents expire twenty
years after the inventor first applied for patent
protection. Thus, even if an invention passes the
novelty, nonobviousness and usefulness tests, and
27
35 U.S.C. § 101
28
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35.
29
Id.
16
the patent specification satisfies the disclosure
requirements, no matter how big or small the
invention, the patent will expire.
Experience shows that patent applications are
not all treated equally, and, in practice, patent
pendency varies. The PTO’s published statistics
demonstrate that examination of applications for
patents in some areas of technology take longer than
applications in other areas. Congress and the PTO
through resource allocation have in effect controlled
the patent term of different types of inventions. The
time from filing of a patent application to its grant
for business methods are the longest. Pendency can
grow for many different reasons. The PTO’s own
backlog leads to deferral of the start of examination
on many patent applications. PTO procedures
requiring several patent examiners to review
allowance of patents in some fields also delays the
grant of patents and limits the scope of their claims.
Although informal, these procedures suppress some
types of patents and have been particularly effective
against business method applications. This is long-
standing practice, and one which Congress certainly
knows and can control. Clearly, there is no need for
the Judiciary Branch to intervene.
IV. Limiting the Kinds of Patentable
Processes Can Only Be
Overreaching Judicial Legislation
Any tests by the judiciary to limit processes
deemed patentable are directly contrary to the
language and intent of the Patent Act. The Patent
Act says what it means and means what it says
17
when it states that a patent may be obtained for
“any new and useful process.”
The Patent Act does not recite that only
chemical processes may be patented. The Patent Act
does not recite that only processes performed by a
machine may be patented. The Patent Act does not
recite that only processes performed by a human
may be patented. The Patent Act does not recite
that business methods and software may not be
patented. The Patent Act simply recites that “any
new and useful process” may be patented.
There is no basis in the Patent Act or its
history that hints that the kinds of processes that
are patentable subject matter should be less than
“any.” Reading limitations that Congress did not
intend into the statute runs the risk of stifling
innovation instead of encouraging innovation.
Inventors and investors need encouragement to
invest in research and innovation. They should know
their successful research and innovation will be
rewarded. Narrowly interpreting “process” hinders
inventors from passionately pursuing their ideas
since there would be no reward for investing time,
capital, resources and effort in pursuing their
innovative ideas.
The Patent Act reflects a balance created by
Congress between public and private interests, one
which this Court has been loathe to alter.30 By
30
See Stewart v Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (“it is not
our role to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to
achieve”).
18
excluding business method inventions and other
kinds of processes from patentability, companies will
be forced to maintain more valuable knowledge in
secrecy. This will decrease the pool of prior art and
will create little incentive for inventors to disclose
their inventions. The underlying Constitutional
purpose of the patent system and Congress’ balances
will be upset. “Calibrating rational economic
incentives, however, like fashioning new rules in
light of new technology is a task primarily for
Congress not the courts.”31
It is within the purview of Congress to change
what constitutes patentable subject matter.32 This is
not a judicial task.
CONCLUSION
In sum, a broad interpretation of the term
“process” is essential to maintain the public policy of
promoting innovation. If the process passes the tests
Congress established in §§ 102, 103 and 112, it is
patentable. The Patent Act neither expresses nor
mandates any further test. “[T]he applicant whose
invention satisfies the requirements of novelty,
nonobviousness, and utility, and who is willing to
reveal to the public the substance of his discovery
31
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 (2003).
32
In addressing changes to the Copyright Act, the Court
reached the same conclusion: “The [Copyright Term Extension
Act] reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes,
judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature’s
domain.” Id. at 205.
19
and ‘the best mode . . . of carrying out his invention,’
is granted ‘the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention throughout the United
States’ for a limited time.”33 Accordingly, the public
policy of promoting innovation is best served by
defining the term “process” broadly in § 101 and not
limiting the term in any manner. Let §§ 102, 103,
and 112 remain the limitation on patentable subject
matter.
33
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150 (citation omitted).
20
For the foregoing reasons, we, the Conejo
Valley Bar Association, urge the Court to reject the
Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test,
and any test for patentability, except those
expressed in the Patent Act.
Respectfully submitted,
Steven C. Sereboff
M. Kala Sarvaiya
Mark A. Goldstein
Michael D. Harris
SOCAL IP LAW GROUP LLP
310 N Westlake Blvd., Ste. 120
Westlake Village, California 91362
(805) 230-1350
ssereboff@socalip.com
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE
CONEJO VALLEY BAR ASSOCIATION
August 3, 2009
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
No. 08-964
BERNARD L. BILSKI and RAND A. WARSAW,
Petitioners,
v.
JOHN J. DOLL, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY of COMMERCE and
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY and ACTING DIRECTOR, PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
Respondent.
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I, Teodora I. Mihaylova, of lawful age, being duly sworn, upon my oath state
that I did, on the August 3, 2009, hand filed with the Clerk’s Office of the Supreme
Court of the United States forty (40) copies of this Brief of Amicus Curiae, and
further sent, via UPS Ground, three (3) copies of said Petition to:
Elena
Kagan J.
Michael
Jakes
Counsel
of
Record
Counsel
of
Record
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FINNEGAN HENDERSON FARABOW
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
Washington, D.C. 20530 901 New York Avenue, N.W.
(202)
514-2217
Washington,
D.C.
20001
Counsel
for
Respondent
(202) 408-4045
Counsel for Petitioners
______________________________
Affiant, Teodora I. Mihaylova
THE LEX GROUPDC
1750
K
Street,
NW,
Suite
475
Washington,
DC
20006
(202)
955-0001
I am duly authorized under the laws of the District of Columbia to administer
oaths.
__________________________________
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
__________________________________
Steven C. Sereboff
Counsel of Record
M. Kala Sarvaiya
Mark A. Goldstein
Michael D. Harris
SOCAL IP LAW GROUP LLP
310 North Westlake Boulevard, Suite 120
Westlake Village, California 91362
(805) 230-1350
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Conejo Valley Bar Association
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
No. 08-964
BERNARD L. BILSKI and RAND A. WARSAW,
Petitioners,
v.
JOHN J. DOLL, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY of COMMERCE and
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY and ACTING DIRECTOR, PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
Respondent.
AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE
This
Brief
of
Amicus Curiae has been prepared using:
Microsoft
Word
2000;
Century
Schoolbook;
12 Point Type Space.
As required by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the Brief of Amicus
Curiae contains 3,588 words, excluding the parts of the Petition that are exempted
by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(d).
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
______________________________
Affiant, Teodora I. Mihaylova
The LEX GroupDC
1750
K
Street,
NW,
Suite
475
Washington,
DC
20006
(202)
955-0001
I am duly authorized under the laws of the District of Columbia to administer
oaths.
__________________________________
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
__________________________________
To Be Filed For:
Steven C. Sereboff
Counsel of Record
M. Kala Sarvaiya
Mark A. Goldstein
Michael D. Harris
SOCAL IP LAW GROUP LLP
310 North Westlake Boulevard, Suite 120
Westlake Village, California 91362
(805) 230-1350
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Conejo Valley Bar Association
Document Outline
- 08-964.amicus.ret.cov.tm
- 08-964.amicus.brief.tables.tm
- 08-964.amicus.brief.tm
- 08-964.ret.amicus.aff.service.tm
- 08-964.ret.amicus.cert.compliance.tm